EXHIBIT A

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      APPEARANCES (Cont.):
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            (Court convened at 10:42:01 a.m.)
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               THE CLERK: Bankruptcy court is now in session.
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           (Colloguy not on the record.)
               THE COURT: Be seated.
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           (Colloquy not on the record.)
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               THE COURT: All right. Rhodes.
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          Appearances, please.
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               MR. QURESHI: Good morning, your Honor. For the
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     record, Abid Qureshi, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, on
10
     behalf of the reorganized debtors. With me in the courtroom is
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     Meredith Lahaie, and on the phone also from Akin, Gump is
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     Howard Jacobson.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MS. LOWE: Virginia Lowe with the Department of
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     Justice representing the United States.
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               MR. SHERMAN: Good morning, your Honor.
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     Shlomo Sherman, local counsel for the reorganized debtors.
               THE COURT: All right. Should we do the
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     IRS claim first?
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               MR. QURESHI: Sure, your Honor. And, your Honor,
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     also on the phone is Shirley Cho of Pachulski, Stang also on
2.2
     behalf of the reorganized debtors.
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               MR. MADDEN: Your Honor --
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               MR. QURESHI: (Indiscernible).
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               MR. MADDEN: -- you also have --
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                THE COURT: Oh, sorry.
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                MR. QURESHI: I'm sorry.
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                MR. MADDEN: Your Honor, you also have Eric Madden
      and Michael Yoder on the phone for the Litigation Trust.
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                THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
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                MR. QURESHI: Okay.
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                THE COURT: Okay.
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                MR. QURESHI: And --
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                THE COURT: First, we have the objection to the IRS
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      claim.
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               MR. QURESHI: Yes, your Honor. If I may proceed,
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     your Honor, first, just by way of background with respect to
     this claim?
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           So what the IRS claim is about is an attempt by the IRS to
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      recover millions of dollars in avoided tax liability from a tax
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      fraud that was committed about a decade ago, and this is a tax
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      fraud, your Honor, that the reorganized debtors and, in
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     particular, Bravo, which is the debtor entity against whom the
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      claim was filed had nothing to do with and nor is it alleged
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      that Bravo was in any way implicated a part of this fraudulent
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      scheme to defraud the IRS.
2.2
           What the IRS is seeking to do, your Honor, we think is try
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      to tag the debtors with liability with this scheme and to do so
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      inappropriately and without evidence. Let me start with the
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     genesis of the claim itself.
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Bravo, rather, was a subsidiary in the Rhodes organization, and the function of that entity was to provide framing services. This was the subsidiary through which laborers built the frame.
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Your Honor, I apologize. I just got a note that the people on the phone cannot hear anything.

THE COURT: Okay.

2.2

MS. CHO: No. We're on Abid.

MR. QURESHI: Oh, you are? Okay. Thank you. I apologize, your Honor. So during the time period from 2000 until 2003 -- and that, your Honor, is the period of time during which these tax liabilities were allegedly incurred -- Bravo hired a subcontractor through which it received laborers that were necessary to complete the framing work that was going on during the housing boom, and I'll come back to that in a little bit more detail.

The company that was retained as a subcontractor was Union Pacific Construction, and I will refer to them, your Honor, as UPC.

So in 2009, the owner of UPC, a gentleman by the name of Robert Kahre -- and I apologize if I'm mispronouncing his name -- he and a number of his associates were convicted in a criminal tax-fraud case by the district court here in Las Vegas, and he I believe is serving a sentence of somewhere in the order of 15 years, and a number of his associates

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involved in the scheme are also serving jail sentences.
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Now, the scheme that was run by UPC was as follows, your Honor: Apparently, UPC provided among other things payroll services to a number of construction companies in the Las Vegas area.

And what Mr. Kahre did through this scheme was he claimed to pay the employees of these various construction companies in gold and silver coins which the employees would then immediately exchange for cash, and what was reported to the IRS was the face amount of the gold and the silver coins which was approximately one-eighth the value of the cash that those employees actually received.

Now, the IRS has alleged that the UPC provided those same fraudulent payroll services to Bravo, and so what it's seeking to recover from the reorganized debtors is the following, your Honor: A priority claim totalling approximately 1.32 million dollars.

Now, importantly, that 1.32 breaks down into approximately \$879,000 in unpaid taxes and \$446,000 in penalty interest which I believe runs up to the petition date and, in addition, an unsecured claim in the total amount of 2.56 million dollars, and that claim, your Honor, is 432,000 in principal and 849,000 approximately in penalty interest.

Now, the legal issue before the Court, your Honor, I think it's actually a fairly straightforward one, the reorganized

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debtor's claim and our objection and with a supporting affidavit that Bravo hired UPC as a subcontractor.
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There is no dispute, your Honor, that if that is correct, if, indeed, UPC was hired as a subcontractor, Bravo bears no responsibility for any taxes that UPC may have failed to pay.

Now, on the other hand, what the IRS claims is that Bravo hired UPC not as a subcontractor, but, instead, as a payroll servicer. That Bravo remained the employer of its laborers and, therefore, remained liable to remit the appropriate payroll taxes to the IRS.

And so the legal question that I think is ultimately determinative of this claim is did Bravo retain UPC as a subcontractor or did Bravo retain UPC as a payroll servicer.

THE COURT: Why isn't that a factual question as opposed to a legal question?

MR. QURESHI: I apologize, your Honor. It is a factual question which is determinative of the legal issue of whether they have a valid claim. That is absolutely correct, so let's start with the proof of claim filed by the IRS.

THE COURT: Well, if it's a factual question, how do we get anyplace today?

MR. QURESHI: Well, here's how we get anyplace today, your Honor. We have submitted in connection with our objection an affidavit. The affidavit is from a Mr. Dean Griffiths (phonetic). He was a former employee of Bravo during the

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      relevant time period here, and his declaration, your Honor, is
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      at Docket No. 1532.
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           He was employed by Bravo from 1996 through 2004, and among
      the titles that he held during his employment at Bravo was
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 5
      general manager and general superintendent.
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                THE COURT: But why? You're not going to dispute a
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     material factual issue here --
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                MR. QURESHI: Respectfully, your Honor --
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                THE COURT: -- because you're, in essence, asking me
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     to discern (indiscernible) --
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                MR. QURESHI: I --
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                THE COURT: -- a summary judgment.
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                MR. QURESHI: Your Honor, I actually don't think it's
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      disputed, and let me explain. So we've submitted his
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      declaration. In his declaration, Mr. Griffiths says very
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      clearly and very directly Bravo hired UPC as a subcontractor.
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          Now, the IRS I believe has no objection to the
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      admissibility of this declaration. It has not requested the
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     presence of Mr. Griffiths to be cross-examined, and so I don't
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     believe that there is any contrary evidence to dispute what
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     Mr. Griffiths has said.
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          What the IRS offers, your Honor, is trial transcripts from
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      the underlying criminal proceeding. And through those trial
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     transcripts, the IRS believes that it can establish that Bravo,
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      in fact, retained UPC as a payroll servicer.
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           But, in fact, your Honor, the trial transcripts, all of
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      them -- and set to the side for a moment their admissibility
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     because, in fact, I don't think they're admissible here.
           But setting that to the side, those trial transcripts
 4
      nowhere say that Bravo retained UPC as a payroll servicer.
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      That is an implication that the IRS asks this Court to draw
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      from those transcripts, and we don't believe it can do so. We
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      don't believe that those transcripts come even close to
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      establishing that.
           And if I might for a moment, your Honor, address on the
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      assumption that the IRS will seek to offer those transcripts
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      into evidence, I think they are plainly inadmissible.
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           Let's start with testimony provided in another proceeding
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      is hearsay. It's clearly hearsay under the federal rules, so
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      the next question is is there an exception through which that
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     hearsay becomes admissible in these proceedings.
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           The Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) is the rule that we
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      look to to see if there is an exception to the hearsay rule
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     that applies here. There are two components to that exception
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      that must be met for these transcripts even to be admissible.
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           First, your Honor, the witness has to be unavailable,
2.2
      and --
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                THE COURT: Well, that's pretty clear.
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                MR. QURESHI: Well, actually, that's what I thought,
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     too, your Honor. There's actually case law that says that
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     because a witness is incarcerated does not conclusively
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     establish that the witness is unavailable.
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                THE COURT: Well, he's not in this jurisdiction, is
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     he?
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               MR. QURESHI: I don't know. He was convicted in
     Las Vegas. I don't know where he is incarcerated, but --
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                THE COURT: Well, there's no federal prison in
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     Nevada, so --
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                MR. QURESHI: Well, there's the answer, then. I
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     guess he's not in this jurisdiction, but that doesn't matter,
     your Honor, because the second part of the test clearly cannot
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     be met.
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          The second part of the test under 804(b)(1) for this
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     testimony to be admissible in these proceedings is that the
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     party against whom the testimony is being offered, in this
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     case, the reorganized debtors, must have had an opportunity to
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     cross-examine the witness in whatever that prior proceeding
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     was.
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          Well, we weren't there, your Honor, during the criminal
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     trial. We had no opportunity to question any of the witnesses
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     whose trial testimony is now being offered in these
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     proceedings.
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                THE COURT: Well, were any of the Rhodes entities
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     indicted or --
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               MR. QURESHI: No.
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THE COURT: All right.

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MR. QURESHI: Your Honor, the Rhodes entities — there is no allegation that the Rhodes entities were in any way involved.

And so what your Honor respectfully is left with in terms of a factual record is a proof of claim filed by the IRS which does nothing, your Honor, except for lay out in a schedule amounts owed and dates those obligations were incurred.

It says nothing about the question of whether Bravo retained UPC as a payroll servicer, and it has no documentary attachment that would suggest that that is the case.

On the other hand, in our objection, we again have the declaration of Mr. Griffiths to which there is no objection. He is competent to testify on the issue. He was the general manager at the time.

And he has stated unequivocally that Bravo retained UPC as a contractor. That it did so, your Honor, because this occurred during the housing boom when there were more homes that required framing than Bravo was able to keep up with.

And given as he explains in his declaration the administrative burden of hiring additional employees and dealing with the paperwork that that involves, Bravo elected to effectively farm that out to an independent contractor, in this case, UPC, and so we don't think, your Honor, that there really is a factual dispute.

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Now, I'm prepared if your Honor would like to go through
in much more detail the specific sections of the trial
testimony to which the IRS points to explain to your Honor why
we don't think that raises even a suggestion that Bravo was
retaining UPC as a payroll processer let alone proof of that
fact.
          THE COURT: Okay.
          MR. QURESHI: So if your Honor would like, I can do
      If your Honor wants to hear from the IRS first,
however --
          THE COURT: Let me hear from the IRS first.
          MR. QURESHI: Okay.
          THE COURT: Okay.
          MS. LOWE: Good morning, your Honor. The debtors say
that Kahre's company was strictly a subcontractor. However, as
debtor's counsel has pointed out, there was a criminal trial in
which Mr. Kahre was prosecuted.
     And one of the elements that he was indicted for was
conspiracy, and this conspiracy was to defraud the
United States by dishonest means for purposes of impeding,
impairing, and defeating the lawful collection and assessment
of Internal Revenue taxes. Those taxes were both income taxes
and employment taxes.
     The manner of the conspiracy was this payroll-service
company that he -- those payroll-service process that he sold
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to other contractors. There was a total of between -- there was a total of 35 contractors which participated in this process.

In the trial testimony, numerous times, witnesses testified to that process. They testified that Bravo was one of those contractors that used this payroll-service process.

It has been established in the criminal trial, and that is what he is found guilty of is using this payroll-service process, and this process that he sold to other contractors which participated.

And in addition, they have submitted the declaration of Dean Griffiths which is not inconsistent with that scenario.

Mr. Griffiths states in his declaration that Bravo became concerned with its ability to handle administrative and recordkeeping requirements from its growing employment, so it was that process which then was transferred over to Kahre to pay some of the Bravo employees.

He said it was an administrative burden, the payment obligations, and so that is exactly what Bravo did. It transferred numerous of its employees over to Kahre to participate in Kahre's payroll-service company.

All of the witness testified to the exact nature of Kahre's relationship to the contractors. We have submitted some of that testimony in support of the IRS claim.

2.2

The debtors have not to this date objected to the amount of the claim. They're just objecting to the fact that they have to pay the claim.

A taxpayer ultimately is responsible for employment taxes. And these employment taxes, you cannot delegate that duty away.

There was a payroll-service company. The payroll-service company did not pay them. And as the cases I've cited in my response to their objection to claim, you can't delegate that away. The employer is ultimately responsible for the payment of those taxes.

THE COURT: Now, if it was truly a subcontractor that provided labor, you agree that Rhodes is not liable.

MS. LOWE: I think we would actually then have to look at all the indices, and, many times, subcontractors are still found liable for employment taxes, so we would have to look at all the specific nature of what -- frankly, they have not submitted any evidence other than Mr. Griffiths' declaration in support of the subcontractor relationship.

And even there in that declaration, it supports the fact that they were transferring over to Bravo the recordkeeping and administrative requirements for the employees of Bravo. They admitted those were Bravo employees that were transferred over onto Kahre's payroll system.

And as Courts have regularly held, in a payroll-service

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type process, ultimately, the employer is the one responsible for the taxes, and that cannot be delegated away. It is a responsibility that remains with the employer. It doesn't matter if the payroll-service company fails to pay it. The action then is against that company to not pay the taxes. THE COURT: Now, Mr. Griffiths' affidavit says, "Bravo engaged Pacific as a subcontractor to provide laborers to work on Bravo's building projects." MS. LOWE: And then he says that the laborers provided were the Bravo employees themselves, former Bravo employees, so what they did is they transferred over a number of their employees to the Kahre payroll service. And he states in paragraph 3, "Bravo became concerned with the ability to handle administrative and recordkeeping requirements for its growing employment." What they were transferring over to Kahre is their payroll service function, and it's consistent with what was found at

What they were transferring over to Kahre is their payroll service function, and it's consistent with what was found at the criminal trial of Robert Kahre. He was operating a payroll service for at least 35 other contractors in the area.

And this was found in a court with a jury. They found him guilty of providing this payroll-service company. He was charging the contractors for it. He didn't pay the payroll over, and it is now due, and it is Bravo's responsibility.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Response.

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               MR. QURESHI: Thank you, your Honor. A couple of
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     points. Counsel says that there was testimony in the criminal
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     proceeding that Bravo used UPC as a payroll processer.
           Respectfully, your Honor, that's not the case. That is
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      an implication that the IRS seeks to draw from that
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 6
      testimony.
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          Nowhere in that testimony is it directly stated by any
      witness that that is the case. There is general testimony
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      about 35 companies that used these services.
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          Now, your Honor, it's important also to look at the
     Department of Justice's own press release issued following the
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      conviction by the jury of Mr. Kahre, and that is attached to
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     our objection. It's Exhibit B at Docket 1377.
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          And in that press release from the Department of Justice,
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     they say the following, your Honor: "Between 1997 and 2003,
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     Kahre owned and operated six construction businesses in the
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     Las Vegas area." It goes on to list the six, one of which is
     UPC.
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19
                THE COURT: Well, now talk about admissible evidence.
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                MR. QURESHI: Well, a fair point, your Honor, and --
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                THE COURT: I could --
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                MR. QURESHI: And, again --
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                THE COURT: Wait. If we do that, we got every
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     article in the RJ --
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                MR. QURESHI: Well --
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THE COURT: -- as evidence in this case. I --MR. QURESHI: And I'm happy, your Honor, to strictly apply the Rules of Evidence here because there is no question that the entirety of those trial transcripts are inadmissible. They're hearsay, and there hasn't even been an argument, your Honor, that there's some kind of an exception to the hearsay rule that applies here. Now, your Honor, if I may? One other point which is counsel suggested that the debtors have not objected to the amount of the claim. Also, not true, your Honor. We do object. We say so in our objection. Our issue is that in addition to the principal amount the IRS is seeking penalty interest. Penalties, my understanding, your Honor, is those are penalties that in order to be imposed require a knowing and intentional withholding of taxes that are owing to the IRS. There's not even an allegation that Bravo knowingly did anything here. And, again, just to return one last time and if your Honor will indulge me, I'm happy to go through the details. But line by line, the evidence, the trial transcripts, the inadmissible trial transcripts to which the IRS points as evidence that UPC was a payroll processer, those excerpts, they just don't say that, your Honor.

It's an implication that they would like this Court to

draw. It's not surprising given that there are 35 companies that were wrapped up in this scheme.

The closest they come, your Honor, in the testimony they cite is to say that some -- there is testimony that says -- I believe it's by a Mr. Rodriguez (phonetic) -- that some workers of Bravo were paid in gold and silver coins.

It does not say in that excerpt, your Honor, whether those workers were employees of UPC or whether those workers were employees of Bravo, and that, your Honor, is the best they can do.

All of the other excerpts are merely general statements in which the nature of the scheme is described in great detail.

But without even an implication let alone a direct statement, that Bravo used UPC as a payroll processer.

The DOJ's press release makes clear -- and the trial transcripts to the extent your Honor let's them in which, again, we don't think they should be let in.

But if they are, those trial transcripts also establish that in addition to this payroll service that, indeed,

Mr. Kahre fraudulently sold to other entities they also had construction companies through which they provided laborers, hundreds of laborers. That's what's in their press release.

That is entirely consistent with Mr. Griffiths' testimony.

And Mr. Griffiths by the way does not say in his declaration, your Honor, that all of Bravo's employees were

transferred to UPC, and that's all there was.

He says Bravo could not keep up with the demand for laborers. They hired UPC to provide laborers. And once that was done with Bravo's consent, Bravo then took its existing laborers, transferred those employees to UPC such that they became employees of UPC with the exception of managers and supervisors for whom Bravo continued to appropriately I might add withhold payroll taxes.

Now, your Honor, we also submitted a declaration from Mr. Bono (phonetic). That also is attached to our objection at Docket 1377.

And what that declaration says, your Honor, is that we went back and I believe actually got these records from the IRS to look at the payroll taxes and records that were filed by Bravo during this period.

And what it shows, your Honor, is that Bravo continued to pay and withhold payroll taxes as it was obligated to do, and so that fact, your Honor, is entirely inconsistent with the theory of the IRS.

If Bravo was trying to pass off to UPC its payroll processing function, well, it doesn't make sense that it would then continue to do that very thing, process payroll and withhold payroll taxes. But, in fact, we have uncontradicted evidence that that's what they did.

So, again, if your Honor strictly applies the

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      Rules of Evidence -- and there's no reason not to -- there is
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     no factual dispute here. There is no evidence that contradicts
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     Mr. Griffiths' testimony.
           Even if your Honor let's in the transcripts, your Honor,
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      those transcripts simply do not establish anything to refute
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      what Mr. Griffiths clearly says in his declaration.
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                THE COURT: Okay. All right.
                MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, I apologize. Could I confer
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 9
     briefly with Mr. Qureshi?
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           (Colloquy not on the record.)
                MR. QURESHI: That's fine, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to -- it seems to me
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      there's a general issue of material fact. I don't think that
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     Mr. Griffiths' affidavit is sufficient to establish as a matter
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     of law that UPC was merely a payroll company.
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           And even then as Ms. Lowe indicated, there may be
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      circumstances in which a company could be liable, so this needs
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      an evidentiary trial.
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           And I think we should bifurcate, first, as to whether
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      Bravo (sic) was -- I'm sorry -- whether UPC was a subcontractor
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      which merely provided payroll or a subcontractor who provided
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      labor as well as payroll.
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           Then if I determine that they provided merely payroll,
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      then we could have a separate evidentiary trial as to the
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     penalty and interest portion, the willing and knowing, so we
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      don't need to go into that in the beginning.
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          First, it is strictly a limited issue, were they the
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      subcontractor for merely payroll or the subcontractor for
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      labor.
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          Question, do you want -- I doubt you could do a settlement
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      conference. Do you want a settlement conference? That's a
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      little difficult with the IRS issues, but I can give you one if
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     you want.
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           (Colloquy not on the record.)
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                MS. LOWE: No.
                THE COURT: No? Okay. So do you want to go to trial
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      in March?
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                MR. QURESHI: Your Honor, may I raise one point
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     before we get to dates? Would it be appropriate just to
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      streamline things for us to brief the question of the
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      admissibility of these trial transcripts?
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                THE COURT: I'm relying on Mr. Griffiths' affidavit
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      alone. I'm going to assume --
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                MR. QURESHI: Okay.
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                THE COURT: -- they're inadmissible at this point.
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                MR. QURESHI: Okay. Thank you.
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                THE COURT: I just find his affidavit is just a
23
      little bit too ambiguous for me, and --
24
                MR. QURESHI: Okay.
25
                THE COURT: And nothing he can say can fix it, and I
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      think that's because there are genuine issues of material fact.
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      I mean, this is an area in which, you know, those lines are
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      crossed. I mean, it sounds like they may have provided some
      payroll and some -- so it's a genuine issue of material fact.
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                MR. QURESHI: Right. But to be clear, your Honor, as
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      to what the factual issue is, it's not whether they were a
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      subcontractor for payroll services versus laborers.
           If they are, in fact, a subcontractor as I understand the
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      way it works, the laborers are the employees of UPC and not of
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     Bravo, and UPC provides those laborers and, in turn,
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     workers' compensation, et cetera, and then it also has the
      obligation to remit taxes on behalf --
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13
                THE COURT: Well, you --
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                MR. QURESHI: -- of those employees.
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                THE COURT: You could still be a subcontractor for
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      one point. You could be a subcontractor to provide payroll and
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      administrative.
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                MR. QURESHI: Fair enough.
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                THE COURT: We're saying the same thing.
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                MR. QURESHI: Okay. As far as the date, your Honor,
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      we'd be pleased to do it earlier if that was possible. But if
2.2
     not, March, certainly.
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                THE COURT: How long do you need to finish doing
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     discovery and how long do you think a trial would take?
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                MR. QURESHI: Well, your Honor, based on our
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     knowledge today of witnesses, I would think it's a single day.
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                THE COURT: Okay.
                MR. QURESHI: And as far as discovery goes --
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                THE COURT: I can't see how --
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                MR. QURESHI: -- I cannot --
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                THE COURT: I mean, you've fooled around with this
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     for six months now. I don't see how you're going to be ready
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     for trial before March. But if you think you are, fine.
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           I mean, you claim that there aren't any witnesses around,
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     and now you say you're going to go to trial and bring those
     witnesses.
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12
          Oh, and by the way, I find Mr. Bono's affidavit to be
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      somewhat useless, so the point being he basically says I don't
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     know anything, and these are my opinions, so it's somewhat
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     useless.
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           (Colloquy not on the record.)
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                MS. LOWE: Your Honor, we would like -- a trial in
     March is fine with us.
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           (Colloguy not on the record.)
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                THE COURT: I mean, I could do January, but will you
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     be ready by January? This is October, already.
2.2
               MR. QURESHI: Your Honor, I guess -- again, first of
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     all, the reason for the delay is there had been settlement
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     discussions that unfortunately didn't go anywhere.
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           I guess the difficulty is that this is all ten years ago,
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      and so we do have a genuine issue with finding people that were
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      involved. We --
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                THE COURT: So I don't get why you want to go to
      trial earlier since you can't find your witnesses. That
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 5
      doesn't quite make sense --
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                MR. QURESHI: March is fine --
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                THE COURT: -- to me, but --
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                MR. QURESHI: -- your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Okay. Let me do the week of March 5th,
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      and I may have Judge Thurman who's assisting us on matters do
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     the trial or I may do it. I'll confer with him and see how our
12
      calendars go, so we'll do it March 5th.
13
           And, pretrial, let's have a pretrial hearing on
14
      January 31st, and that can be telephonic for everyone, and have
15
     your pretrial briefs (sic) in by -- sorry -- pretrial
16
      statements in by January 26th.
17
           In this one, I think it will be very helpful to have
18
     pretrial briefs as well in beforehand, so that as I'm going
19
     through the evidence I can see, well, what is the law in this
20
      regard, what's the dividing line between merely a payroll and
21
     merely a laborer. Okay.
2.2
           Thank you.
23
               MS. LOWE: Thank you.
24
               MR. QURESHI: Your Honor, I'm sorry. Is there a time
25
     of day for --
```

```
1
                THE COURT: Oh, excuse me.
 2
               MR. QURESHI: -- the status conference --
 3
                THE COURT: I apologize.
 4
               MR. QURESHI: -- on --
 5
                THE COURT: Yes.
               MR. QURESHI: -- the 31st?
 6
 7
                THE COURT: 9:30.
 8
               MR. QURESHI: Thank you.
 9
                THE COURT: Let's make it 10:00 since that is
10
     probably -- or 10:30?
11
                THE CLERK: 10:30?
12
                THE COURT: Don't you think that makes sense because
13
     the 9:30 matters seem to take forever?
14
               THE CLERK: Sure. We'll do it at 10:30 --
15
                THE COURT: Okay. 10:30.
16
                THE CLERK: -- then.
17
               MR. QURESHI: Thank you.
18
                THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right.
19
          Now let's go to the -- and, Ms. Lowe, you can certainly
20
      stay or you can be excused, whatever you wish.
2.1
           (Colloquy not on the record.)
2.2
                THE COURT: All right. Next, let's go to Greenway.
23
               MS. LAHAIE: Good morning, your Honor.
2.4
     Meredith Lahaie, Akin, Gump --
25
               MS. CHO: And, your Honor --
```

```
1
                MS. LAHAIE: -- Strauss --
 2
                MS. CHO: -- it's Shirley Cho. May I be excused as
 3
      well?
 4
                THE COURT: Yes.
 5
           (Thereupon, Shirley Cho, Esq., was excused
 6
           at 11:13:40 a.m.)
 7
                MS. LAHAIE: -- Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld,
 8
      for the reorganized debtors.
 9
                THE COURT: Okay.
10
                MR. HAGUE: Good morning, your Honor. David Hague on
11
     behalf of James Rhodes of Fabian & Clendenin.
12
                THE COURT: Okay. All right. Go ahead.
13
                MS. LAHAIE: As your Honor may recall, we were last
14
     here before you with respect to the first half of the
15
      reorganized debtor's claim objection as it related to the
16
     Greenway Partners claim, and the Court had deferred
17
      consideration of the scheduled claims.
18
           Before I move into the substance of my argument on the
19
      scheduled claims, your Honor, there's one matter I'd like to
20
      address.
21
           And that is shortly before court began this morning when
2.2
     my colleague and I were on the way to court, we received
23
      notification that a further declaration had been filed just
24
     this morning.
25
           It's unclear what matters the declaration relates to.
```

2.2

Although based on the facts, it may relate to both the Greenway claim and the first of the three scheduled claims.

I've also advised your Honor that opposing counsel does not have copies, although I will say that I have read the brief contents of the declaration.

But, your Honor, at this point in the process, we have been through two rounds of briefs on this claim objection, one in 2010 and one that took place over the summer.

At which point, both sides submitted briefs and declarations and whatever other materials they thought may advance their argument.

And, your Honor, the reorganized debtors at this point have to object to Mr. Rhodes' last-second Hail Mary litigation strategy that has typified his actions in connection with this matter. We simply do not think it's appropriate for the declaration to be considered at this time.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LAHAIE: I don't know if you want to deal with that matter first, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I'll strike the declaration, too late.

MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, before I move into the scheduled claims, I believe there was one matter that was still outstanding from the end of our last hearing, and that related to one evidentiary matter with respect to the Greenway claim.

2.2

And that was Mr. Anderson's allegation that the

Main Amundson (phonetic) report which forms the basis of a

number of Rhodes' arguments that that document should be

admitted under one of the hearsay exceptions to the

Federal Rules of Evidence, and, your Honor, I believe that the specific exception that was cited was the business-records exception.

Your Honor, I can speak to the rule itself, and I can read the rule into the record, and, obviously, your Honor is I'm sure familiar with the rule and knows that the simple fact that Mr. Anderson stated that that rule and his belief would make the Main Amundson report admissible Mr. Anderson has not met any of these requirements that are, you know, contained within that rule.

He has not submitted any evidence as to whether or not the Main Amundson report was prepared in the ordinary course of business as would be required under the Rule of Evidence.

We don't think it's applicable, and, your Honor, I'm happy to address it further or submit something in addition if you feel that it's necessary.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, that brings us, then, to the scheduled claims which are on for today. Your Honor, the reorganized debtors in a number of their submissions have included a chart that may assist the Court as I go through my

argument, and I can direct your Honor to one of those instances.

It's in Docket No. 1466 which is the reorganized debtor's objection, and there is a chart that appears on page 10 of that document that sets forth the three scheduled claims --

THE COURT: Okay.

2.2

MS. LAHAIE: -- and a short recitation of the reasons why the reorganized debtors believe those claims to be invalid.

At the outset, your Honor, I will note that the reorganized debtors believe that we do have authority to amend the schedules, and we're seeking, obviously, a declaration from this Court that you agree with that. And to the extent that you don't, we're seeking to have these claims disallowed.

So, your Honor, that brings us to the first of the scheduled claims which is a claim asserted by Rhodes against Rhodes Homes Arizona in the amount of approximately \$151,999.

Your Honor, this claim ties very closely to the Greenway Partners claim. Mr. Rhodes alleges that he is entitled to this amount as compensation for the fact that he had to advance funds to certain of the debtor's employees.

Again, your Honor, we're in the circumstance that we were in connection with the Greenway Partners claim. There is no evidence. There is no documentation.

Rhodes alleges that the mere fact that this claim appears

on the schedules should be evidence that this Court should consider that the debtors have conceded to the validity of this claim.

However, as set forth in the briefs, your Honor, that is not the case. The debtors have made no such admission, and, again, there is certainly no evidence to support any entitlement on Rhodes' behalf to that claim.

And, again, as your Honor may recall in connection with the Greenway arguments, Rhodes himself was in charge of preparing the schedules.

And this is, yet again, another instance when Rhodes most likely either himself made that ledger entry or directed someone else to make the ledger entry that reflects \$151,000 being owed to him by that company, and, your Honor, that's simply not evidence that this Court should recognize to substantiate that claim.

Turning next, your Honor, to the Pinnacle Equipment (phonetic) claim which appears on page 11 of the chart, this is the most substantial of the three claims, and its asserted value is \$557,000.

Your Honor, the basis of this claim appears to be a contract that Rhodes alleges existed, but that he has not been able to find and has not been able to produce, and that is referenced to the Main Amundson report, but it is not attached.

Your Honor, we've obviously requested the document, and

2.2

neither party has it within their possession. I can only state that Rhodes has conceded on numerous occasions that the document does, in fact, exist, and that it does govern the parties' understanding with respect to the debtor's usage of that equipment.

Now, your Honor, the substance of Rhodes' allegation here is that the debtor entity, that Pinnacle Grading (phonetic) that used the equipment at issue, overutilized that equipment more than what had been contemplated by the parties when entering into the contract.

But, your Honor, Rhodes hasn't been able to identify any provision within the contract that he can produce that would enable him to assert some kind of true-up payment or other legally-cognizable basis under the contract that would entitle him to be paid and compensated for amounts that he claims were generated in excess of what is bound by the contract.

Saying it differently, your Honor, there is no provision and no alleged provision in this alleged contract that says if the debtors overutilize the equipment that Rhodes will then be entitled to a corresponding claim for that amount.

Your Honor, what Rhodes is, in effect, doing is admitting that he struck or at least in his own words and in his own opinion that he struck a bad deal, a bad bargain with the debtor entities, that did not cover the actual usage that the debtors had employed this machine for.

2.2

And he basically wants to be able to restrike that deal and have this Court impose some kind of equitable arrangement which, your Honor, this Court should not do given that Rhodes himself has conceded the existence of the contract.

But he wants to be able to rewrite that deal and to restrike that bargain after he has already admitted that he has executed a document with the debtors that's supposed to govern the usage of that piece of equipment.

And, your Honor, Mr. Rhodes cannot have it both ways. He cannot say that on one hand there is a contract that governs the usage of this equipment, but, on the other hand, well, that document isn't really sufficient to protect me and what I think that I'm equitably entitled to, and, your Honor, yet again, Rhodes has not asserted a legally-cognizable justification to those funds.

And, lastly, your Honor, is the Sedora Holdings claim which is at the bottom of the chart, and this is a \$167,000 claim asserted against Heritage.

Your Honor, I should note that Rhodes has referenced a document that he believes contains the lenders' acknowledgement that this claim existed which in some ways substantiates his entitlement to be reimbursed for that portion of litigation expenses.

And, your Honor, I'd like if we could to turn to that portion of Rhodes' submission, and I'm looking now, your Honor,

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1
      at Docket No. 1464-3. This is Mr. Huygens' declaration, and
 2
      it's attached as an exhibit, your Honor.
 3
           (Colloguy not on the record.)
                THE COURT: Hang on. I don't have it for some
 4
 5
      reason.
              Wait.
 6
           (Colloguy not on the record.)
                MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, I'm happy to hand up the
 7
 8
     page I have. I'm not sure I need it to speak from.
 9
                THE COURT: Yeah. That would be helpful. We have a
10
     new system which doesn't work with that.
11
                MS. LAHAIE: I'll just read it into the record --
12
                THE COURT: Okay.
13
                MS. LAHAIE: -- your Honor --
14
                THE COURT: That's fine.
15
                MS. LAHAIE: -- before I hand it up as well.
16
                THE COURT: Yeah.
17
                MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, the reference that
18
     Mr. Huygens makes is to a portion of the credit agreement, and
19
      it's schedule 4.19 that corresponds I believe to Section 4.19
20
     which in the credit agreement is labelled brokers.
21
           I won't read the section from the credit agreement, but I
2.2
     will read what I believe Mr. Rhodes had been referring to which
23
      is a schedule labelled brokers fees.
24
          And it's two lines, your Honor, and it states that, "The
25
     borrowers have received oral correspondence in respect of a
```

2.2

claim for an alternate transaction fee from Deutsche Bank. As of the date hereof, the borrowers believe that this claim is without merit."

And, your Honor, as best as the reorganized debtors can tell, this is the concession that Rhodes is citing to in which the lenders have acknowledged that this litigation has existed.

And that, presumably, there have been litigation fees incurred that the reorganized debtors now share a burden to participate in.

But, your Honor, as I'm sure you can tell from me reading those two lines into the record, there is no admission, no recognition, no acknowledgement of any litigation, any litigation fees incurred, anything that would substantiate the allocation of litigation expenses across any of the debtor or nondebtor entities.

And in no way does this document, your Honor, substantiate any entitlement that Rhodes may have to assert a claim for these litigation fees.

And, your Honor, the other point that we make in our briefs -- and I'll make it brief up here as well -- is that the way that the Rhodes entities, both the debtor and the nondebtor entities, were structured it was a pass-through structure, so that anything that was attributable to the debtor entities would have flown up.

So to the extent that there would rightly have been --

```
1
      which, again, there's no evidence in the record to
 2
      substantiate.
 3
           But to the extent that Rhodes could somehow demonstrate
      that some portion of these litigation costs should be allocated
 4
 5
     to Heritage, the fact that Heritage is a pass-through entity
 6
      and whatever value it does or doesn't have ultimately flowed up
 7
      to Rhodes in any event, it's irrelevant whether Rhodes actually
 8
      allocated that value to Heritage in the first place.
 9
           Your Honor, I have nothing else to add. There are a
10
      number of other arguments that Rhodes makes, some of them I
11
     alluded to at the beginning of my presentation with respect to
12
     Rhodes' position that the reorganized debtors have somehow
1.3
      conceded to the validity of these claims.
14
           Those are all set forth in detail in the papers.
15
      your Honor has any other questions, I'm happy --
16
                THE COURT: No.
17
                MS. LAHAIE: -- to answer them.
18
                THE COURT: Thank you. Okay.
19
           Opposition.
20
                MR. HAGUE: Good morning, your Honor. David Hague on
     behalf of Jim Rhodes. The reorganized debtors have continued
21
2.2
     to assert that there is just simply no evidence or no
23
      documentation before this Court on any of these claims, the
24
      Greenway or the scheduled claims.
```

What is before the Court are several reports. There's

25

2.2

declarations. There are W-2s that show that they are employees of the debtor's. There are copies of checks. There's copies of wire transfers.

There's books and records that shows reimbursements going to Rhodes because he's made these payments. He's made these payments for compensation.

There is a lot of evidence that Mr. Rhodes has put forward before this Court that they haven't done anything to rebut.

They haven't asked to take a 2004 examination of any of these individuals. They haven't done any subpoenas. They haven't done anything to even demonstrate that what we've put forward is not relevant.

They haven't done anything to even rebut what's in any of the declarations, Mr. Rhodes' declaration or Mr. Huygens' declaration.

In their briefs, they have said that if Rhodes puts forth facts or evidence sufficient to establish a claim, then the burden shifts to the debtors to show facts tending to defeat the claim by probative force equal to that of the allegations of the proof of claim.

And as I have stated, with the Greenway claim and with the compensation claim which is on the Rhodes Home -- I'm kind of trying to talk about those together because it was the same principle -- Mr. Rhodes was making compensation payments to

```
1
     employees of the debtors.
 2
          This was shown by the W-2s that we have submitted.
 3
     They're attached to Mr. Rhodes' declaration that show that
 4
     these were debtor employees.
 5
           In his declaration, he says, "In order to avoid a
 6
     disruption in the office, I made these payments to them on the
 7
     side."
 8
           I submitted a declaration today which has been stricken
 9
     that says the same, but that is the arrangement that he had,
10
     and there are payments that have come back in to Mr. Rhodes to
11
     show and to account for these.
12
          Now, on the Greenway one, he wasn't paid about $800,000
13
     for these payments, but I have set forth --
14
                THE COURT: Now, Mr. --
15
                MR. HAGUE: -- with this Court --
16
                THE COURT: There are a number of entities that did
17
     not file bankruptcy that Mr. Rhodes held.
18
                MR. HAGUE:
                            That --
19
                THE COURT: And Mr. Rhodes --
20
                MR. HAGUE:
                            That's correct.
2.1
                THE COURT: -- indeed, did not file bankruptcy
2.2
     himself.
23
                MR. HAGUE:
                            That's correct, your Honor.
24
                THE COURT:
                            Okay.
25
                MR. HAGUE:
                            That's correct. But my point is is that
```

```
1
      these were employed by debtor entities. Coyne, Chin, Stephens,
 2
      and Hansen (phonetic) were all employed by debtor entities.
 3
           And I don't know what else we can show this Court other
      than through declarations that haven't been challenged, through
 4
 5
     W-2s that haven't been challenged, through checks that haven't
 6
     been challenged, and through wires that haven't been challenged
 7
      that are coming from Rhodes accounts --
                THE COURT: Why couldn't it --
 8
 9
                MR. HAGUE: -- to these individuals.
10
                THE COURT: -- have been a capital contribution, in
11
      essence?
12
                MR. HAGUE: Why could what?
13
                THE COURT: Why wasn't it, in essence, a capital
14
      contribution?
15
                MR. HAGUE: Well, Rhodes was entitled to a
16
      distribution of 2.5 million under the credit agreement, and
17
      that's oftentimes how it would work.
18
           If he made payments to these individuals, then they would
19
      go ahead and subtract what he was owed at the end of the year
20
      under this 2.5-million-dollar distribution, but the books show
21
      that he did not receive a distribution up to this amount.
2.2
           Now, he paid over $2,000,000 worth of wages to these
23
      individuals and was reimbursed about 1.2 million, but that's
24
      the arrangement they had in the office.
25
           And they keep talking about no agreement and no contract.
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```
1
     Well, there was performance. These individuals worked for
 2
     several years.
 3
           It's in Mr. Huygens' declaration. It's in Mr. Rhodes'
     declaration, and no one has done anything to rebut that
 4
 5
     testimony. I mean, talk about, you know, genuine issues of
 6
     material fact.
 7
           If these were employees of the debtor which no one has
     fought about and if, in fact, he made these payments to them
 8
 9
     outside out of his own pocket, then he is entitled to
10
     reimbursement.
               THE COURT: Why isn't it a gift?
11
12
               MR. HAGUE: Because they did services for the debtor.
13
               THE COURT: He can make a gift. It's his companies.
14
               MR. HAGUE: Yeah. But that's not what he has stated
15
     in his declaration, so we now know there's not a gift. These
16
     are facts. These are facts --
17
                THE COURT: Well, sure. After the fact, he does it.
18
               MR. HAGUE: No. This happens as he goes through.
19
     That's why he has already been reimbursed 1.2 million.
20
               THE COURT: And he wants even more money.
21
               MR. HAGUE: He wants what he paid out, your Honor.
2.2
               THE COURT: He wants even more money.
23
               MR. HAGUE: Your Honor, you may not like the
24
     situation. I understand that, but I'm just telling you what we
25
     have submitted and what they have failed --
```

```
1
               THE COURT: After he --
 2
               MR. HAGUE: -- to even rebut.
 3
               THE COURT: -- sneakily --
 4
               MR. HAGUE: I'm sorry?
 5
               THE COURT: After he goes around his own company to
 6
      pay these people --
 7
               MR. HAGUE: Your Honor --
               THE COURT: -- how is that equity?
 8
 9
               MR. HAGUE: Your Honor, he was --
10
               THE COURT: How does he have clean hands?
11
               MR. HAGUE: He was the --
12
               THE COURT: You're asking for equity. How does he
13
     have clean hands?
14
               MR. HAGUE: Well, I'm not even necessarily -- I'm
15
      asking for more than equity. I'm asking for something that's
16
      just built into a contract pretty much and performance.
17
               THE COURT: Why didn't he write --
18
               MR. HAGUE: Now, you're asking --
19
               THE COURT: -- a contract?
20
               MR. HAGUE: I'm sorry?
21
               THE COURT: Why didn't he do a contract?
2.2
               MR. HAGUE: Why did he need to do a contract if there
23
      was performance? You're asking that why they did this around
24
     his companies.
25
          Your Honor, he was the companies. He was the nondebtor.
```

```
1
     He was the debtor. He was the CEO. And as the CEO and the
 2
      director and the sole shareholder, he has 100-percent right to
 3
     be able to say this is the type of arrangement we're going to
 4
      do.
 5
           I'm going to employ you, but guess what? There's a whole
 6
     bunch of other folks in this office --
 7
                THE COURT: I want to cheat.
                MR. HAGUE: There's a whole bunch of other folks in
 8
 9
      this office who are going to want to cheat up their amount that
10
      they're owed.
11
           They're going to come and say, hey, what about us.
12
      just found out he's making this amount of money through his
13
      W-2, so what does he do because -- give you an example.
14
           Chris Stephens, he was in charge --
15
                THE COURT: So he chooses --
16
                MR. HAGUE: -- of entitlements.
17
                THE COURT: -- to employ them on his own.
18
                MR. HAGUE: So he chooses to pay them on his own for
19
      the work they were doing for the debtors --
20
                THE COURT: Which helped him as well.
21
                MR. HAGUE: -- which helped the debtors.
2.2
                THE COURT: Which helped him.
23
                MR. HAGUE: I guess if you're saying they're one
24
      economic unit, and he is benefiting the exact same way the
25
      debtors are.
```

But we're talking about a proof of claim for amounts that he paid the benefit of the debtors, and I'm just talking strictly on the Greenway and the Rhodes Home Arizona.

I mean, we've given stacks and stacks of evidence, and they're clamoring for more evidence, and we don't know what else to provide.

I think at the very least, though, there's issues of material fact whether or not these employees then were employed or whether or not they did work strictly for the debtors.

Now, it says it in the declaration which no one's challenged, but I don't see how we can simply just resolve an issue and call this a clear legal issue when there's this many facts before the Court. If your Honor would like, I'll move on to the other two in the scheduled claims.

THE COURT: Okay.

2.2

MR. HAGUE: I think I've kind of tackled the Greenway and the Rhodes Home Arizona.

The Pinnacle Grading, your Honor -- and we still haven't really addressed the Main report. I understand that counsel has objected to it on the basis of hearsay.

But that report was done strictly for the purpose of going in to sort out what was going on between Rhodes, the debtors, and the nondebtors, basically, to determine whether or not it was fair the way things were allocated. There was over \$500,000,000 of intercompany loans.

```
1
          And so the Main report comes in, and the reason that
 2
      that's created is because they wanted to basically make sure
 3
      that everything was done in a fair manner and allocate it
 4
      properly.
 5
          Now, under the equipment and the grading arrangement that
 6
      happened, they were supposed to pay lease payments. And,
 7
      instead, they paid the note payments, and the note payments
 8
      were less than the lease payments. They overused the
 9
      equipment.
                 The equipment depreciated, and there was a loss.
10
      It's as simple as that.
11
          Now, it's not Rhodes as the individual that's claiming
12
      this. This is one of his entities that's claiming that they
13
      were hurt by the fact that this company did not pay what was
14
      due under the lease. They paid the note payments.
15
                THE COURT: But we don't have the lease.
16
                MR. HAGUE: No. We don't have a lease.
17
                THE COURT: Got it. Well, isn't it convenient that
18
     you say the lease says that they're entitled to overutilization
19
      without a lease?
20
                MR. HAGUE: Yeah. I understand your point. There's
21
      no lease. We've tried to find it. Mr. Rhodes says there's a
2.2
             The prior CFO in the office says there was a lease.
23
      The attorney said that he created a lease, and I cannot find
24
      it, your Honor.
25
                THE COURT: Okay.
```

```
1
                MR. HAGUE: Under the last one which is the
 2
      Heritage Land -- and that's for the one owed to Sedora -- this
 3
      one again, your Honor, is quite simple.
           Several entities including Rhodes were sued by
 4
      Deutsche Bank under an exclusivity agreement which later became
 5
 6
      as what -- Credit Suisse later was the one who became the
 7
      actual lender, and so Deutsche Bank sued several of these
 8
      entities, including Rhodes.
 9
           And Sedora who was not in the credit facility and who
10
      was not sued ended up fronting a lot of these litigation
11
     payments.
           And so this is simply just a reimbursement for funds that
12
13
      were paid to the law firm that was retained in New York to
14
      fight this off.
15
                THE COURT: Wasn't Sedora part of the lawsuit or no?
16
                MR. HAGUE: No. No. Sedora is a nondebtor entity.
17
      It was not a part of the lawsuit to my understanding, and,
18
      again, we have submitted, your Honor, books and records of the
19
      debtor that show that the debtors made quite a few of these
20
      litigation payments.
21
           But there was a screwup in accounting, and so Sedora ended
2.2
      up making, you know, $150,000 or so of these payments on behalf
23
      of the debtors, but they had no say in this litigation.
24
      weren't sued.
```

In fact, Rhodes eventually was dismissed from the lawsuit,

25

```
1
      and so what you have is just simply again a reimbursement of
 2
      costs that were done by, one, a nondebtor entity or a debtor
 3
      entity, and, I mean, that's how you get to the claim under the
      Heritage Land and the Sedora. It --
 4
 5
                THE COURT: Okay.
 6
                MR. HAGUE: Does your Honor have any questions --
 7
                THE COURT: No.
                MR. HAGUE: -- for me on these?
 8
 9
                THE COURT: Thanks. All right.
10
           Response.
           (Colloguy not on the record.)
11
                MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, I'll be very brief. I think
12
13
      your Honor has a very good grasp of the legal issues that are
14
      at stake here.
15
           And I think that your Honor has hit the nail on the head
16
      with respect to the Greenway Partners claim in the first of the
17
      scheduled claims, and, your Honor, I also think that opposing
18
      counsel and I are talking past each other a little bit here.
19
           Your Honor, we are not contesting the fact that there has
20
     been evidence produced in connection with these claims, and,
21
      again, we have not contested the admissions made in the
2.2
     declaration.
23
           And, your Honor, the reorganized debtors are not
24
      contesting the fact that these individuals are employees of the
25
      debtors.
```

2.2

We're not even contesting the fact at this point, your Honor, that these payments were made to these individuals, and that, your Honor, is the sum and substance of the evidence that has been produced on these claims.

And, your Honor, what has not been produced and what cannot be produced because it does not exist is a contract or a document or a legally-binding instrument that would demonstrate both that Rhodes has a legal obligation to pay these individuals and then that the reorganized debtors have a legal obligation to reimburse Rhodes.

THE COURT: Well, what about his argument that performance creates the contract?

MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, there has been no evidence whatsoever that the performance that was undertaken by these individuals was done for the benefit of the debtor entities themselves.

Your Honor, it's my understanding that these individuals performed services both for the debtors and for the nondebtor entities, and --

THE COURT: Why doesn't that create a factual issue as to Greenway? If they perform, if there was performance and if they did work for both, why doesn't that create a factual issue as to allocation or whether or not there was a contract?

MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, I will admit if there had been a contract and otherwise a legally-binding obligation

2.2

owing on the part of Rhodes or the reorganized debtors to these individuals or to Rhodes, respectfully, then there may be some kind of factual distinction as to how those allocations should be made and what portion of those fees should ultimately be paid to Rhodes.

THE COURT: Well, did the Rhodes entities pay some of the Greenway amounts and did they reimburse Mr. Rhodes for some of those amounts?

MS. LAHAIE: My understanding, your Honor -- I can confer with Mr. Bono who is here in the court. My understanding is that those amounts were paid by Rhodes. Let me just step back, your Honor.

Prior to the petition date, I understand that the debtors paid these individuals whatever their salary had been in accordance with what was typical for the company, i.e., what all the other employees were aware that these individuals were making.

And that based on my understanding Rhodes had negotiated undocumented understandings and arrangements with these specific individuals.

And the purported justification was so that the employees would not be upset or otherwise frustrated by these payments which then your Honor may question whether these were (indiscernible) market payments to begin with these other payments to these individuals.

```
1
           And Rhodes made -- you know, it's impossible for me to say
 2
      whether he made all of the payments that he had allegedly
 3
     promised these individuals --
 4
                THE COURT: No. Going backwards.
 5
                MS. LAHAIE: -- that he would make.
 6
                THE COURT: Was there performance by Rhodes entities
      repaying Rhodes and/or Greenway?
 7
 8
           (Colloquy not on the record.)
 9
                THE COURT: In other words, was there, indeed,
10
      performance which can show there is a contract or are you
11
     denying there was any performance?
12
                MS. LAHAIE: My understanding, your Honor, is that
13
      the Rhodes entities did not reimburse Rhodes for any portions
14
      of these payments if that's the question that you're asking.
15
                THE COURT: And counsel said --
16
                MS. LAHAIE: But --
17
                THE COURT: -- the opposite.
18
                MR. HAGUE: Yes, your Honor. Absolutely.
19
                THE COURT: Okay.
20
                MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, if I could confer briefly
21
      with my client?
2.2
                THE COURT: Okay.
23
           (Colloquy not on the record.)
24
                MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, unfortunately, I don't have
25
      that information.
```

```
1
                THE COURT: Okay.
                MS. LAHAIE: But based on my understanding, those
 2
 3
      payments had not been made, but, unfortunately, we can't say
 4
      definitively at this time.
 5
                THE COURT: Okay.
 6
                MS. LAHAIE: But, your Honor, it remains the
 7
      reorganized debtor's position that without a legally-binding
 8
      document or agreement --
 9
                THE COURT: Well, but the Statute of Frauds doesn't
10
      require a written contract. I mean, it requires a contract,
     but a contract can be shown by acceptance, offer, or
11
     performance. I mean, there's no Statute of Frauds, right?
12
13
                MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, I admit I haven't looked
14
      closely at that issue.
15
                THE COURT: Okay.
16
                MS. LAHAIE: But it certainly hasn't been raised by
17
     the Rhodes entities nor have they submitted any evidence that
18
      would support the fact that there was some sort of offer and
19
      acceptance by both parties.
20
           There has been no evidence that this Court has admitted as
21
      to what the understanding was of the individuals that Rhodes
2.2
      allegedly had this informal agreement with that would
23
      substantiate that kind of claim.
24
                THE COURT: Okay.
25
                MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, briefly, with respect to
```

2.2

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Pinnacle Grading -- and, again, I think your Honor hit the nail on the head with this one, too -- and that there is no lease, and it is very convenient for Rhodes to allege that he is entitled to these sort of makeup or true-up payments under the terms of a document that he acknowledges exists but cannot produce.
```

And, again, your Honor, even Rhodes himself by his opposing counsel's characterization of the Main Amundson report which is -- and I'm paraphrasing maybe a bit, your Honor, here.

But opposing counsel characterized it as being strictly for the purposes of determining what was going on between the debtors and nondebtors.

And, your Honor, that admission alone I would think means that the Main Amundson report could not possibly be considered a business record that would be exempted from hearsay because it was clearly created for a specific purpose and not in the ordinary course of business.

And, your Honor, the reorganized debtors (sic) -- or the Rhodes entities should not be entitled to rely on that as admissible evidence in this court. Unless your Honor has anything further --

THE COURT: Okay. And on the actual Greenway claims, he's seeking the money advanced to them. How is that different from $-\!\!-$

MS. LAHAIE: From the --

```
1
                THE COURT: So on the Greenway claims, I guess
 2
      counsel is claiming there was performance as to that payment.
 3
      That they were paid. That he was reimbursed partially for
 4
      that.
 5
           Is that correct?
 6
                MR. HAGUE: May I address it --
 7
                THE COURT: Yes.
                MR. HAGUE: -- real quickly? Yes, your Honor.
 8
 9
      respect to the Greenway claims as well as the one on the
10
     Rhodes Home Arizona, we're talking about the same compensation.
11
          We have alleged and through the declaration that he paid
12
      over $2,000,000, and that he was reimbursed 1.2. The same with
13
      the lawsuit where he made payments, he has been reimbursed a
14
     portion of that, not all of it.
15
                THE COURT: Okay.
16
                MR. HAGUE: That's the course of performance we're
17
     talking, no Statute of Frauds --
18
                THE COURT: Okay.
19
                MR. HAGUE: -- not the sale of goods.
20
                MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, I will also say that there
21
      is some discrepancy amongst Rhodes' own documents as to what
2.2
      amounts he is owed in connection with Greenway Partners' claim
23
      and what amounts, if any, had been reimbursed.
24
          And so I think from that, your Honor, I think the Court
25
      should imply or infer that no such amounts -- your Honor should
```

not give the benefit of the doubt to Rhodes.

2.2

Your Honor may recall that Rhodes had set forth one amount in his proof of claim with respect to the amounts he believed he was owed in connection with the Greenway Partners, and I'm looking for the exact dollar amount, but it was closer to \$900,000. It was certainly in the \$800,000 range.

And in support of Rhodes' own entitlement to those funds, he cites as his primary form of evidence the Main Amundson report.

Aside from the hearsay issues associated with that document, the Main Amundson report sets forth a claim somewhere in the realm of \$600,000 that Rhodes is entitled to on account of that claim.

So even with respect to Rhodes' own evidence and the evidence he has put forth before this Court, there is no consensus as to what he is owed on account of that Greenway claim.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. All right.

Well, with respect to Greenway and the Rhodes

compensation, there is factual issues about whether or not

there was a contract.

And your briefing didn't really address that issue. You just say there's no written contract. Well, that doesn't end the issue.

There doesn't have to be a written contract if there is a

2.2

contract established by the general principles of contract law, you know, was there a course of performance that shows there was a contract, and that wasn't addressed.

So I guess there's a factual issue as to was there a contract for the Rhodes estates to repay Rhodes on account of the compensation.

Now, I tend to think that even then there may be other defenses such as you can now recover the money he's repaid because he shouldn't have been paid that.

But that's I guess an issue that's all wrapped up in your other litigation as well, so there's a factual issue as to that.

I will sustain the objection as to the Pinnacle Grading. There is no written contract. Well, nobody can produce the contract.

If there is a written contract, you certainly can't claim quantum meruit which you haven't really alleged, and there's no reason to believe that the contract would have required overusage, so that objection is sustained.

The Heritage Land, there is an allegation that there was, of course, a conduct which establishes a contract to repay those amounts. A, was there a contract and, B, to what extent did the estate benefit? Maybe there's a fraudulent transfer.

I will sustain the objection to the admission of the Main Amundson report. I do find that's hearsay. So in making

```
1
     my decision, I'm not relying on the Main Amundson report.
 2
           So I quess we need some scheduling orders to see where we
 3
      are in getting these things all resolved. Do you want to come
     back in about a month to let me know where we are?
 4
 5
                MS. LAHAIE: I think --
 6
                THE COURT: Do you want a settlement conference
 7
      again?
 8
                MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, we've given that a couple
 9
     bites at the apple. I'm not sure at this point it would be
10
     productive.
11
                THE COURT: Okay.
12
                MS. LAHAIE: The one thing I will remind, your Honor,
13
      if we could move as expeditiously as possible as we can.
14
      your Honor knows, we do have the litigation, the
15
     Litigation Trust, that's awaiting the pendency of the outcome
     of this. I --
16
17
                THE COURT: Well, you're talking about such small
18
      amounts now in the scheme of things. Why are we fooling around
19
      with this as opposed to just going forward on the other things?
20
      I mean, you're now talking about a total of -- well, he asked
21
      for 800,000.
22
                MS. LAHAIE: And your Honor may also recall that the
23
      outcome of the tax claim, Rhodes had taken a timely appeal of
24
      that issue, and that appeal is still pending also resolution of
25
      this issue.
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1
               THE COURT: Okay. Well, you tell me when you're
 2
     ready for trial.
 3
               MR. HAGUE: Well, just looking at this, there's going
     to be several witnesses that I think we're going to have to
 4
 5
     take depositions of, and I would --
 6
               THE COURT: Why haven't you done it, already?
 7
               MR. HAGUE: Huh?
               THE COURT: Why haven't you done it, already?
 8
 9
               MR. HAGUE: Well, we submitted the declarations of
10
     the witnesses that we have. The one that I had today was
11
     stricken, and so I'm going to have to probably do that again.
12
               THE COURT: I know. Why haven't you taken their
13
     depositions before?
14
               MR. HAGUE: I --
15
               THE COURT: Why have we waited?
16
               MR. HAGUE: Because we thought the declarations would
17
     be sufficient evidence. They're willing to put forward their
18
     testimony. It hasn't been rebutted. That's why we haven't
19
     taken --
20
               THE COURT: Well --
21
               MR. HAGUE: -- their depositions.
2.2
               THE COURT: -- when are you ready for trial?
23
               MR. HAGUE: I propose the same time you granted the
24
     other one which was only a very simple issue which is March.
25
               MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, I just think that given that
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1
     that there's a whole basket of litigation that's pending the
     outcome of this. We just would like to move as
 2
 3
     expeditiously --
 4
               THE COURT: Well --
 5
               MS. LAHAIE: -- as possible.
 6
               THE COURT: -- look, you guys have continued this
 7
     thing 20 times, already, so don't blame me because you guys
 8
     have continued this from like June a year ago. I mean, I
 9
     appreciate you want to move it fast, but you waited a year.
10
     You can have December 5th.
11
               MS. LAHAIE: December 5th, your Honor?
               THE COURT: December 5th.
12
13
               MS. LAHAIE: That's fine --
14
               THE COURT: Are you going to be ready --
15
               MS. LAHAIE: -- for the reorganized debtors.
16
               THE COURT: -- by December 5th?
17
               MS. LAHAIE: We can be --
18
               THE COURT: If I give you a date --
19
               MS. LAHAIE: -- your Honor.
20
               THE COURT: -- I want you to be ready. No
2.1
     continuances.
22
               MR. HAGUE: We'll be ready, and this is an
23
     evidentiary hearing, correct?
24
                THE COURT: Evidentiary hearing on whether or not
25
     there's a contract -- on the objection to claim on those
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1
      two issues, the Greenway -- three, Greenway, the Rhodes
 2
      compensation, and the litigation expenses.
 3
           We can bifurcate it as to amount, well, and I guess that
      doesn't make any sense. We need to have it at the same time to
 4
 5
     know if there was a contract to what extent, if at all, is the
 6
      estate responsible.
 7
           And if you intend to amend your lawsuit for a fraudulent
      conveyance of what he's paid back, already, do it. I mean,
 8
 9
     maybe what he was paid already is a fraudulent conveyance. I
10
      don't see why it wouldn't be.
11
                MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, if I could just ask for one
     point of clarification also with respect to the Pinnacle claim?
12
13
     You sustained the debtor's --
14
                THE COURT: Sustained the objection.
15
                MS. LAHAIE: And just to be clear as to procedurally
16
      what happened then, we had sought relief, just stricken that
17
      from our schedules.
18
           My understanding is that once that happens and
19
      (indiscernible) do that the Rhodes entities would then have
20
      30 days to file a proof of claim. I don't know to what extent
21
      we can try to end run that process.
2.2
                THE COURT: I just find there's no merit to the
23
     Pinnacle claim.
24
               MS. LAHAIE: Okay.
```

MR. HAGUE: Your Honor, we would not file a proof of

25

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1
     claim on the Pinnacle. The way I understand it is because the
 2
     way it was scheduled we never had to file a proof of claim.
 3
     This serves as their objection. We're not going --
 4
               MS. LAHAIE: Okay.
 5
               MR. HAGUE: -- to file --
               THE COURT: Okay.
 6
 7
               MR. HAGUE: -- a proof of claim on that.
 8
               THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
 9
               MS. LAHAIE: That's all.
10
          Thank you.
               THE COURT: All right. So do you want December 5th
11
12
     for a trial?
13
               MS. LAHAIE: We do, your Honor, yes.
14
               THE COURT: All right.
15
               MS. LAHAIE: Thank you.
16
               THE COURT: Is a day sufficient?
17
               MS. LAHAIE: Yes --
18
               MR. HAGUE: I think one day --
19
               MS. LAHAIE: -- your Honor.
               THE COURT: Okay.
20
21
               MR. HAGUE: -- would be fine.
2.2
               THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
23
               THE CLERK: Your Honor, are you going to hear that --
24
               THE COURT: I'm sorry.
25
               THE CLERK: You're going --
```

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1
                THE COURT: I can't hear you.
 2
                THE CLERK: You're going to hear --
 3
                THE COURT: Yes.
                THE CLERK: -- the trial December 5th? Okay.
 4
                THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
 5
 6
                THE CLERK: Thank you.
 7
          All rise.
           (Recess at 11:46:54 a.m.)
 8
 9
           (Court reconvened at 11:49:04 a.m.)
10
                THE COURT: Be seated.
           (Colloguy not on the record.)
11
12
                THE COURT: Sorry. I forgot the motion to quash and
13
      look on these shortened times. Just because you're going to be
14
     here on a certain day doesn't mean that you think you can
15
      shorten time on stuff four days in advance.
16
          That's why I put this for a status only. It's nonsense,
17
      and it's nuts because we never get good responses when things
18
      are on shortened time, so don't do it again. Okay.
19
          On the motion to quash, when do you want to argue it? I
20
      want a reply. I guess I just got the reply today.
21
                MR. HAGUE: Whatever works for this Court. All we
2.2
     would have left to file would be our response, and I know
23
     there's other objections now that have objected to this, and I
24
     don't know if the Court would prefer to have this all together.
25
      I know there's two other parties here today.
```

```
1
               THE COURT: Yeah.
 2
               MR. HAGUE: And --
 3
               THE COURT: That's why I think motions to shorten
 4
     time in this area are stupid.
 5
               MR. HAGUE: Your Honor --
 6
               THE COURT: And they didn't consent to it, either.
 7
               MR. HAGUE: Your Honor, the only reason we did it was
     to try to get before the Court, so we could get something laid
 8
 9
     out because of the extent of the subpoenas.
10
               THE COURT: I understand. But to ask for four-days'
11
     notice, you knew this was happening weeks ago.
               MR. HAGUE: Your Honor, we filed the motion for
12
13
     shortening time the day we filed for the subpoena which was
14
      immediately. I apologize to this Court, but that's what we
15
     did.
16
               THE COURT: Okay. All right. Two weeks, is that
17
     sufficient? I want responses. I want it all together.
18
     that sufficient? Let me know.
19
               MR. HAGUE: No. I think that we need more time than
20
     two weeks.
21
               THE COURT: Okay.
2.2
               MR. HAGUE: I'd say a month.
23
               THE COURT: Okay. Now, does that affect the
24
     discovery for the trial?
25
               MS. LAHAIE: Your Honor, you're looking over here,
```

```
1
     but I believe the matter is being handled by Litigation Trust
 2
      counsel on the phone. I'm not sure if they're still on.
 3
                THE CLERK: They're not. I already hung up.
                MS. LAHAIE: Okay. Your Honor, this is not a matter
 4
      that Akin, Gump --
 5
 6
                THE COURT: Okay.
 7
                MS. LAHAIE: -- is handling.
                MR. HAGUE: Your Honor, just so I understand, though,
 8
 9
      if we're on the same page, they have their subpoenas. We have
10
      our objection and motion to quash. Other parties do as well.
11
          They have filed their reply I think just to my motion to
12
      quash, not to these others, and now you're asking that we all
13
      file replies within a month and have a hearing here within a
14
     month? I --
15
                THE COURT: You all have --
16
                MR. HAGUE: I don't understand.
17
                THE COURT: -- a hearing in month.
18
          Well, get them on the phone.
19
           (Pause at 11:51:06 p.m.)
20
           (Colloquy not on the record.)
21
           (Pause concluded at 11:52:33 p.m.)
2.2
                THE COURT: Well, you know, are they back on? No?
          Also, well, where is the certificate that you attempted to
23
24
      confer in good faith --
25
                MR. HAGUE: We filed it with the court.
```

```
1
               THE COURT: -- before you filed this?
 2
               MR. HAGUE: Yeah. It was just filed with the court.
 3
     You're talking about on our motion to expedite?
 4
               THE COURT: Right.
 5
               MR. HAGUE: Yeah. It's there.
 6
               THE COURT: No. Your good faith under the discovery
 7
     rules.
 8
               MR. HAGUE: We filed the attorney-acknowledgement
 9
            I thought that's what we were supposed to file.
10
               THE COURT: But under the Federal Rules of Discovery,
11
     you're supposed to attempt to confer in good faith.
               MR. HAGUE: We did, your Honor, and we put that in
12
13
     the attorney acknowledgement. We said that we called counsel
14
     and asked if they would be willing to have this hearing today.
15
               THE COURT: That's a separate issue.
16
               MR. HAGUE: Then what issue are you --
17
               THE COURT: Under the discovery rules, you're
18
     supposed to confer in good faith before you bring motions to
19
     quash. Did you do that?
20
               MR. HAGUE: Yes, we did. We did it on a call.
                                                                We
21
     had a conference call with them.
2.2
               THE COURT: And did you attempt to resolve anything?
23
               MR. HAGUE: Yes, we did. It was with the
24
     Litigation Trust, the firm out of Texas.
25
               THE COURT: All right. Well, let's set this hearing
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1
     for next week. When did the other parties file their
 2
     objections and who filed? I don't see any on -- well, I can't
 3
     tell. I can't get on.
 4
               THE CLERK: All right. Thank you.
 5
               MR. HAGUE: Your Honor, they filed. It's Document
 6
     No. 1555, and I think it's just in response to --
 7
               THE COURT: No, no, no, no. You told me other
 8
     entities have now filed objections to the motion to quash. Who
 9
     else --
10
               MR. HAGUE: Oh, I'm --
11
               THE COURT: -- has filed one?
12
               MR. HAGUE: I believe it's Omaha. Is
13
     it --
14
               MR. GLOVER: Your Honor, Chet Glover here on behalf
15
     of Mutual of Omaha. We filed an objection to the subpoena for
16
     the 2004 exam. That's Document 1547.
17
               THE COURT: But you didn't file a motion to quash.
18
               MR. GLOVER: We did not.
19
               THE COURT: Okay.
20
               MR. GLOVER: Yeah.
21
               THE COURT: So then I don't have your motion on, so
2.2
     there's no motion to quash.
23
               MR. GLOVER: Correct, your Honor.
24
               THE COURT: Did anybody else file a motion to quash?
25
               MR. THOMAS: No, your Honor.
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1
                THE COURT: All right. Why did you tell me they had?
 2
                MR. HAGUE: They filed an objection. If I misspoke
 3
      and said a motion to quash, I apologize. They filed an
 4
      objection.
 5
                THE COURT: All right. So we'll have a hearing next
      week, then. We'll have a hearing on October 5th at 9:30, and
 6
 7
      I'm going to require presence of counsel, any counsel that
 8
      intends to argue. All right.
 9
           Thank you.
10
           And I suggest you try and work it out.
11
           (Colloquy not on the record.)
                THE CLERK: All rise.
12
13
           (Court concluded at 11:55:16 a.m.)
14
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16
17
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25
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I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
 1
       from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in
 2
 3
       the above-entitled matter.
 4
 5
 6
       /s/ Lisa L. Cline
                                                  10/04/11
       Lisa L. Cline, Transcriptionist
 7
                                                    Date
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